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1. Introduction 
 
Regional trade agreements (RTA) have long been a significant part of a wider strategy that aims at 
strengthening trade ties among African countries in general, and ECOWAS countries in particular
1. 
The theoretical literature suggests that the removal of the formal tariff barriers should lead to a 
significant increase in trade flows, and the trading partners could get a variety of benefits ranging from 
more rapid economic growth to increased welfare, at least in the long run. 
 
However, as it is often the case with RTAs, much of the focus has been put on tariff barriers to trade, 
leaving out non-tariff barriers (NTBs) that could in some cases be associated with more constraints to 
trade than the formal tariffs. Some evidence suggests that despite the long experience of integration in 
Africa (e.g. more than three decades with ECOWAS), intra-regional trade has not improved 
significantly (Hanink and Owusu, 1998). While this may reflect the ineffectiveness of the existing 
RTA-related tariff reductions, we hypothesize that it is an indication of the relative importance of the 
remaining barriers to trade (e.g. NTBs). If this is so, a more comprehensive, coherent, and successful 
integration strategy would need to address the issue of NTBs. This is also the conclusion reached by 
Yang and Gupta (2007), who argue that “African countries need to undertake more broad-based 
liberalization and streamline existing RTAs.”  
 
This process of assessing the importnce of RTAs inevitably starts with an attempt to quantify their 
relative magnitude.  In this study we set out to analyze the relative importance of the remaining 
barriers to trade in agricultural commodities both in Africa overall, and in ECOWAS.  
 
The agricultural sector derives its strategic importance in African countries from its social and 
economic contributions. In effect, a large proportion of the population still depends on farming for 
their main sources of income and labor. Therefore a successful RTA, with its associated gains in 
efficiency, could be expected to lead to a significant improvement in living standards the continent 
desperately needs, especially for the poor (who are predominantly found in agriculture). 
 
The empirical methodology that we use is based on the comparison between potential trade and actual 
trade. In an ideal world, where all the frictions to international trade are removed (either through 
bilateral or multilateral agreements, or through domestic policies tackling issues related to 
transportation infrastructure, administrative rules, corruption, and the like), one would expect countries 
to trade with the rest of the world at their full potential. Therefore, the trade gap – i.e. the difference 
between actual and potential trade flows – would not be significantly different from zero. The actual 
world trading system obviously falls short of this hypothetical ideal, for many reasons, some of which 
are imposed upon countries (physical distance for instance), while others are endogenous (such as 
NTBs), and therefore offer room for trade-related policies. In cases where tariff barriers have been 
removed – as is the case for agricultural goods within ECOWAS – negative gaps would mean that 
countries are still trading below their potential, after controlling for all the relevant factors that shape 
                                                            
1 The Lagos Treaty on May 28, 1975 founded the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Its 
fifteen members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea (Conakry), 
Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Mauritania withdrew in 2000. countries’ international trade patterns. This would be a clear (if indirect) indication of the importance 
of NTBs and other sources of trade resistance. 
 
To determine the trade potential of countries, we begin by estimating a gravity model. The 
specification we use is theoretically sound, and relates bilateral agricultural trade flows to countries’ 
economic size (e.g. GDP), and a vector of multilateral resistance variables. The data used cover 135 
countries, of which 36 are in Sub-Saharan Africa.  This allows us to put trade within ECOWAS and 
other African countries into a worldwide context.  The data are for 2000, 2003, and 2006, although for 
some countries we only have data for one or two of these years.    
 
The main results show that agricultural trade flows are larger for countries that are bigger in size and 
closer to one another, as the gravity model predicts. Agricultural trade volumes are higher when tariffs 
are lower, and membership of a free-trade area boosts trade yet further. 
 
We find that even after controlling for a wide range of variables including tariffs, and FTA 
membership, the countries in ECOWAS trade agricultural goods more than expected.  This strongly 
suggests that non-tariff barriers on agricultural trade are not relatively high among these countries.  
Consistent with this view is our observation that the nominal rates of assistance to agriculture in the 
ECOWAS countries are generally negative, in contrast with the norm in most of the rest of the world, 
where agricultural protection is widespread.  This does not mean that there are no remaining barriers to 
agricultural trade – we found clear evidence of extensive bribe-taking by highway police in Senegal, 
for instance – but such barriers do not appear to be as detrimental to trade as we had initially supposed. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides some background, and is followed by a 
short case study of transport costs in Senegal. Section 4 offers some details about the empirical 
methodology. Section 5 describes the data by highlighting some key facts about intra-regional trade in 
Africa as well as external trade. Section 6 presents and discusses the estimation results.  A short 





One of the key patterns of the world trading system is undoubtedly the proliferation of free trade 
agreements (FTA). The past decade and a half has witnessed an acceleration in the pace of formation 
and expansion of regional trade agreements. During the four and a half decades of the General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a total of 124 RTAs were notified to it; from 1995, when 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established, through 2006, the figure rose to 243 RTAs 
(Ferrantino 2006). This amounts to an annual average RTA notification of less than three from 1947 to 
1994, and 20 from 1995 to 2006. As a result, each country is now involved in at least one trade 
agreement, with an average number of five agreements signed by each country, and it is estimated that 
nearly 40 percent of world trade occurs within these preferential blocs (World Bank, 2004). African 
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countries have also adopted a similar trade strategy, with a total of ten intraregional RTAs on the one 
hand, and a complex web of cross-regional RTAs on the other (Ferrantino 2006).
2 
 
This popularity of RTAs around the world, including in Africa, relates mainly to the economic 
arguments that present free trade as a powerful tool for achieving economic and social development, 
coupled with the glacial progress of the Doha round of WTO-sponsored multilateral trade negotiations.  
The international trade literature has suggested two types of gains associated with regional integration 
policy, as first documented by Viner (1950), and developed by Lipsey (1957). There are the static 
gains that stem from better access to larger markets, which would enable countries to fill the gap 
between potential trade and actual trade. This happens when the increase in trade with the new 
member countries (trade creation) outweighs the potential decrease in trade with non members (trade 
diversion). In addition, there are the dynamic gains that come from scale economies and structural 
changes in the economy. The reduction or elimination of tariff barriers generates trade and growth 
opportunities for domestic economic activities. 
 
The prospects of preferential trade agreements to African countries could be quite substantial in terms 
of economic and social benefits. When the fifteen West African states established ECOWAS in 1975, 
the stated goal was to promote economic integration in “all fields of economic activity, particularly 
industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary 
and financial questions, social and cultural matters .....” In 1993, the Treaty was revised to “reflect the 
desire of the member countries to deepen the integration process and accelerate economic development 
through the establishment of an economic and monetary union, and the strengthening of political co-
operation within the region.” 
 
Agriculture is by far the most strategic sector in the development process of the continent, because it 
employs on average nearly half of the labor force and constitutes a major source of income.
3 The 
removal, or at least the reduction, of trade barriers would lead to the expansion of the sector, which 
could then take advantage of the subsequent larger markets. Gains from these sectors would first 
improve the economic and social conditions of the population, especially the large part that depends 
directly or indirectly on farming. In the second stage of the development process, as the productivity of 
the sector rises and other sectors start getting their share in this general dynamic (the structural 
change), the contribution of farming activities to GDP, labor, and income would become less 
important. As a general result, over the course of this structural transformation, the economy as a 
whole would have benefitted in terms of more trading, especially with the other RTA members, as 
well as economic growth, and improved wellbeing. 
 
However, after more than three decades, the regional integration process in Africa has generated, at 
best, mixed results. The statistical evidence first indicates that agriculture still contributes to about one 
                                                            
2 The ten RTAs in Africa: Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Pan-Arab Free Trade Area, Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU/UEMOA), 
Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), Central African Economic and Monetary Union 
(CEMAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS/CEEAC), Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), East African Cooperation (EAC), and Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 
3 World Development Indicators, 2008. Non-Tariff Barriers in ECOWAS    Page 5 of 28 
fifth of total economic activity; this has not significantly changed from 1960-1980 to 1981-2006.
 4 In 
some countries, it has significantly increased, as in Liberia, where the share has more than doubled. On 
the other hand, a larger proportion of the population still depends on agricultural activities as the main 
source of labor and income. Nearly half of the labor force is used in the agricultural sector. For 
instance, the figure for Senegal in 2004 was 51 percent, and 85 percent for Burkina Faso in 2005 
(World Bank). These figures, coupled with the fact that most of the countries trade more with third 
countries than with other members, could be an indication that the regional trade agreements may not 
have brought significant structural change either in economic activity or the labor force. 
 
As for the trade creation and trade diversion effects of African RTAs, the results are also mixed. 
Musila (2005), comparing the trade performance of ECOWAS, ECCAS, and COMESA, suggests that 
trade creation and trade diversion vary across regions and over time. His findings indicate that trade 
creation has been relatively important, except for ECCAS countries, and trade diversion on the other 
hand has been found to be very weak, resulting in a positive net effect. Along these lines, Carrerre 
(2003) shows that African preferential agreements have generated significant intra-regional trade 
during their implementation, even though this has been achieved through trade diversion. This positive 
effect has been shown to be stronger when the RTA goes with currency unions. However, a study by 
Hanink and Owusu (1998) shows some contradictions.
5 The authors first claim that the trade pattern 
still shows a low intensity of intra-regional trade, suggesting that the preferential trade agreements, 
after many decades, have not brought a significant rise in the share of intra-regional trade in the 
members’ total trade (on average 10%). Moreover, for most of the countries, the major trading partners 
are still outside the region. Some analyses even indicate that this trade pattern overall is similar to what 
it was prior to the formation of the regional blocks, and point to the ineffectiveness of most of the 
African RTAs in promoting trade among their member countries, although Foroutan and Pritchett 
(1993) do not find that African countries trade less than one would expect from a gravity model. 
 
We find some evidence that non-tariff barriers do indeed exist in parts of ECOWAS, and document 
this in the next section.  This is in line with the widespread perception that although tariffs on 
agricultural trade within ECOWAS have been eliminated, non-tariff barriers – including perhaps 
quality control measures, monopolistic effects, technical standards, and transportation barriers – may 
remain substantial.  This proposition – that NTBs are important in agricultural trade within ECOWAS 
– is what we test in this paper. 
 
3. Case Study: Transport Cost Barriers in West Africa 
 
To get a better sense of the possible scope of non-tariff barriers to trade in West Africa, we 
interviewed fifteen truckers in Tambacounda, Senegal, on August 18-21, 2009.  Although this is an 
opportunity sample, and is too small to yield statistically representative results, the exercise did yield 
some useful information, as reported below.  Recent work has linked transport cost to the volume of 
trade (Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Limão and Venables, 2001); a recent survey of transport costs, carried 
                                                            
4 Authors’ calculations, from World Development Indicators, where available (same for the next statistics). 
5 Those differences in the findings may have to do with the more important focus on the currency unions in 
Carrere (2003), which appear “to have largely reinforced the positive effect on the corresponding preferential 
trade agreements on intra-regional trade, while dampening their trade diversion effect.” (Abstract).  out by the World Bank in Africa, covered only four main corridors, and did not include Senegal or its 
neighbors (Teravaninthorn and Raballand, 2008). 
 
Tambacounda is an important truck stop on the routes that link Dakar with Guinea, Mali, and Guinea-
Bissau.  Our sample included truckers on the latter two routes. Most of the trucks carried either bulky 
manufactures (cement, tires, sugar, flour), or agricultural products (rice, peanuts, baobab fruit, maize, 
sweet potatoes, onions, smoked fish, and millet). Transport companies hire the trucks from their 
owners, and employ the drivers, who in turn are provided with money to pay for fuel, tolls, and 
informal fees. 
 
Corruption happens at road check points where truckers are subject to some safety controls. Most of 
the carriers are old trucks and are likely to be stopped and charged for some "infraction" such as old 
tires or excessive weight, opening the door to corruption. Drivers typically pay bribes in such cases, to 
avoid larger fines, and to reduce the time that they are delayed at the checkpoints.   
 
Table 1.  Transport and Corruption Costs, Dakar-Kayes and Dakar-Bissau 
 Dakar-Kayes  (Mali)  Dakar-Bissau 
Distance (km)  750    666   
Driving time, minutes  2,880    4,320   
Of which: spent at checkpoints  296    732   
 CFAF  US$  CFAF  US$ 
Value of cargo  3,557,143  7,887  6,500,000  14,412 
All-in rental price of truck for trip  643,750  1,427  650,000  1,441 
 - Fuel cost (estimated)  225,000  499  199,800  443 
 = Rental price net of fuel cost  418,750  928  450,200  998 
Memo:  Rental cost per km  858 1.90  976  2.16 
Corruption costs:         
  Bribes  31,286  69  58,333  129 
  Cost of lost time  43,054  95  76,284  169 
  Memo: value of a minute driving  145  0.32  104  0.23 
Memo items:         
Corruption costs as % of net rental cost  18%    30%   
Corruption costs as % of value of cargo  2.1%    2.1%   
Source: Author interviews, Tambacounda, August 2009. 
Note: In August 2009, the exchange rate was 451 CFAF/USD. 
 
 
The key numbers from our interviews are shown in Table 1.  The overall cost per kilometer is not 
especially high, and indeed is lower than the $2.79 per kilometer found by Teravaninthorn and 
Raballand in a World Bank study in 2008. But it is nonetheless inflated by the cost of bribes, and by 
the opportunity cost of the time spent at checkpoints (which is between 10% and 17% of the total 
journey time). Overall, corruption costs come to between 18% and 30% of the net rental cost, which is 
substantial by any standard.  This is somewhat higher than the figure of 10% found by Teravaninthorn 
and Raballand (2008). Drivers repeatedly pleaded for less uncertainty about the checkpoints, and for a 
system where they are charged only once if there is an infraction.  The full corruption costs are 
equivalent to 2.1% of the value of the cargo, which may be interpreted as the tariff equivalent of the 
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corruption on the road.  In short, we have some evidence that non-tariff barriers, at least in the form of 




The well-established theoretical literature on FTAs suggests that a reduction or removal of tariffs on 
imports vis-à-vis some countries has the potential to boost trade flows with the new partners, and 
reduce trade flows with third countries. These effects are known as trade creation and trade diversion, 
respectively (Viner, 1950). The net gain to the society as a whole in terms of welfare improvement 
arises when the positive trade creation effect outweighs the negative trade diversion effect. In addition 
to these static, short-run effects, the economy can also reap some dynamic benefits that originate in the 
structural change subsequent to the initial productivity gains of the booming sectors (the agricultural 
sector could be a good candidate for African countries). In short, in the long run, the economy could 
benefit as a whole in terms of higher productivity, more trade flows, and increased welfare. The 
increase in the countries’ international trade may push actual trade flows towards potential trade flows, 
gradually reducing any gap between the two. 
 
Although these results are mostly derived from total trade, a case can be made that they should also 
hold for a major subset of international trade, namely trade in agricultural commodities. This paper 
formally assesses the relevance of all these factors on trade in agricultural commodities, and the 
relative extent of their effects in the context of African countries in general, and ECOWAS countries 
in particular. This would allow one to make some reasonable inference as of the relative importance of 
the unobserved NTBs in terms of possible gaps between actual and potential trade flows. 
 
To quantify these different trade effects arising from RTAs, the empirical literature has suggested a 
variety of methods. By far the most popular methodological approach is the gravity model. It was 
developed by analogy with Newton’s gravity law in physics that relates attractive forces between two 
objects positively to their masses and negatively to their physical proximity. Tinbergen (1962) is 
believed to have been the first to apply the same idea to trade flows: two countries are more likely to 
trade the bigger their masses are (e.g. GDP) and the closer they are to one another. This simple idea 
can be expressed as follows: 
 
01 2 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) . ijt it jt ij ijt ijt T GDP GDP D β ββ δ =+ × + + + X ε      (1) 
 
In this baseline specification, Tijt represents trade flows between country i and country j at time t, GDP 
the gross domestic product (proxy for country masses), D the distance between countries, X a vector of 
other factors that could potentially affect trade such as whether the countries share a border, or a 
common language, and ε a statistically well-behaved error term. 
 
The economic rationale behind this simple equation is that higher income is an indication of larger 
production of goods and services in the exporting countries and higher demand in the importing 
countries. On the other hand, trade is inhibited by distance, which increases the transportation cost, as 
well as other transaction costs. 
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This intuition, coupled with the high predictive power of the model in early estimations, have made it 
the workhorse of empirical international trade. It also offers a straightforward way to estimate trade 
barriers and their effects on trade flows, as well as other factors that have the potential to shape 
countries’ international trade patterns, as summarized in the X  vector. Some of these factors are 
observable in nature, like tariff barriers, free trade agreements, or institutional factors (language, 
border, colony, etc.). These observables can be easily handled in so far as the statistical information is 
readily available. An important and quite challenging task has been how to deal with unobservables, 
non-tariff barriers being the most important one, at least from a public policy perspective. In an ideal 
world, where all the barriers and non barriers to international trade are removed, one could reasonably 
hypothesize that all countries should be trading at their full potential; therefore there would not be any 
(significant) gap between actual and potential trade flows. But a slew of frictions mean that many 
countries are trading below their potential. In order to quantify the relative importance of each one of 
these factors in explaining the gap in trade performance, one would simply need to include these 
variables in the gravity model.  One strategy to go about it would be to account for all possible factors 
that affect trade flows, and attribute any remaining unexplained gap between actual and potential trade 
to the unobserved variables, provided that the most appropriate econometric techniques are used to 
both estimate the model and deal with the many theoretical and empirical concerns raised about the 
gravity equation. Our methodological approach follows such a strategy. 
 
A second specification is also considered to account for the welfare effect of RTAs, namely trade 
creation and trade diversion. Following Cernat (2001), we consider two series of RTA variables, 
INTRA_RTA and EXTRA_RTA. The first is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the pair considered is 
in the same corresponding RTA, and 0 otherwise. The second variable is also a dummy that takes the 
value of 1 if one country in the pair is a third partner. Table 2 summarizes how the sign of the 
estimated coefficients could be interpreted in terms of trade creation or trade diversion.
6 
 
A country granting discriminatory preferential trade creates a bias that would more likely favor the 
recipients over the third countries. The reduction in tariffs and other barriers reduce the relative price 
of items from the member countries. As a result, the country should be importing relatively more from 
the partners, and relatively less from the outsiders. The trade creation arises from any increase in trade 
flows due to this change in the tariff structure. Any reduction in trade consecutive to the preferential 
agreement is referred to as trade diversion. 
 
Table 2.  Trade Creation and Trade Diversion: Sign of the Coefficients 
    Intra_rta (=1 if both countries are members of the rta) 
   +  – 
+  Trade creation  Trade creation  Extra_rta (=1 if 
one country is an 
rta member)  -  Trade diversion  Trade diversion 
Source:  Adapted from Cernat (2001), p. 12. 
 
                                                            
6 Similar methodologies that capture trade creation and trade diversion effects using dummy variables can also be 
found in Endoh (1999) and Soloaga and Winters (2001). Non-Tariff Barriers in ECOWAS    Page 9 of 28 
We include the appropriate dummy variables for three major RTAs in Africa: ECOWAS, COMESA, 
and SADC, and four non-African RTAs: the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), and the European Union (EU).  
 
Until recently, a major limitation of the gravity equation has been a lack of theoretical background, 
despite its undeniable empirical success. Subsequent research has set out to fill the void: Anderson 
(1979) derived the equation within a framework of perfect competition, where domestic consumers’ 
decisions to buy domestic-made or foreign-made goods are described by the Armington assumption. 
Krugman (1980), and then Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), built the model from a monopolistic 
competition framework. These theoretically-oriented works have suggested additional explanations for 
trade flows, namely international price differentials, and what are referred to as multilateral resistance 
variables, or simply trade cost functions. The resulting reduced-form theoretically-grounded model 
then has the following specification: 
 
11
01 ln ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) .
ijt







= + + −−+ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ × ⎝⎠
X ε   (2) 
 
In this framework, the X  vector is the trade cost function, and the price variables are referred to as the 
multilateral price resistance terms. The cost function is supposed to be linear (although the theory does 
not suggest a clear functional form), and include, apart from distance, arguments such as common 
borders, common language, colonial ties, free trade area or a measure of the tariff barriers, and 
currency union. Other unobserved factors can fall in the error term, and help explain any potential gap 
between actual and potential trade.  
 
Sometimes, these unobservables can be dealt with in a panel structure using a series of fixed effects, 
which have three key roles in this econometric setting. First, they help capture some unobserved 
heterogeneity in the countries’ performance in the international arena that is country- or time-specific. 
Second, they help deal with the multilateral price resistance variables, because we can almost never get 
fully satisfactory statistical information on ideal prices. Third, properly structured, they help deal with 
the endogeneity issue that arises, particularly with the FTA variable. Other ways of dealing with the 
endogeneity exist, and Baier and Bergstrand (2005) provide a recent review of the most widely used 
techniques: Heckman control function, instrumental variable method, fixed effects panel model, and 
differenced panel model. The first two are mostly applied to cross-sectional data, and are shown to be 
unreliable methods for tackling the endogeneity of the FTA binary variable. 
 
The first-differencing panel model is shown to be the most appropriate when the time dimension is 
large and under the assumption that the first differenced error term is white noise, i.e. the error term 
follows a random walk (Wooldridge, 2002). But in the context of the data at our disposal with only 
three years (2000, 2003, and 2006), such an strategy would dramatically reduce the number the 
number of degrees of freedom of the estimations, and more importantly, would pose an identification 
issue when it comes to generate a series of fixed effects. Therefore, we use the fixed effects panel 
model.  To account for both the endogeneity of FTA and the multilateral price resistance, the empirical 
literature suggests including bilateral-pair fixed effects (ij), along with country and time fixed effects Non-Tariff Barriers in ECOWAS    Page 10 of 28 
(it and jt). The time fixed effects in particular come about because of the time-varying nature of the 
price indexes. Baier and Bergstrand (2005), although preferring the first-differencing panel because the 
time frequency of the data allow them to use it, argue that the fixed effects panel model is a 
satisfactory way to both address the endogeneity issue and to ground the empirical exercise in well-
established theoretical foundations.
7  On the other hand, the inclusion of fixed effects requires more 
data, and removes much of the policy-relevant variation – for instance, variables such as membership 
of ECOWAS drop out – which limits its usefulness for our purposes. 
 
Nonetheless, in some of our estimations we consider the following reduced-form, theoretically-
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where RTAijt is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if there a free trade agreement between the pair 
of countries in year t, and 0 otherwise; CU a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the pair has the same 
currency, LANG a dummy for common language, BORD a dummy for common border, LL a dummy 
for landlocked countries, TRF a measure of the average tariff rate on agricultural products for the 
importing country, and the Zijt are dummy variables for specific free-trade areas (such as ECOWAS, 
the EU, and so on). 
 
We are supposing that causality runs from RTAs to trade, but there is some potential for endogeneity 
here: it is possible that countries that trade a lot are more amenable to joining together in a regional 
trade agreement (Márquez-Ramos et al. 2005).  Baier and Bergstrand (2005) find that cross-section 
techniques such as instrumental variables do not resolve the issue, and argue that the use of panel data 
can help resolve the issue (and yields larger effects of FTAs on trade than had previously been 
thought).  Our focus is somewhat different, as we are interested in the sign, but not necessarily the 
magnitude, of membership of ECOWAS on agricultural exports, but our use of data from three years 
(2000, 2003, and 2006), and inclusion of zero-export cases, work to reduce any potential downward 
bias in the estimates. 
 
5. Data  
 
5.1. Trade Patterns of ECOWAS countries 
 
The trade data matrix on exports is from the UN COMTRADE database, and includes information on 
135 countries with populations of more than one million (for a listing, see Table A4) observed in 2000, 
 
7 Marquez et al. (2005) provide a reexamination of the methodological approaches as well as the results in Baier 
and Bergstrand (2004). Non-Tariff Barriers in ECOWAS    Page 11 of 28 
2003 and 2006.
8 For each of these years, we first look at the ten most-exported agricultural products 
by ECOWAS countries. 
                                                           
 
There is a surprising degree of specialization in export crops across the countries of ECOWAS. The 
Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana dominate the exports of cocoa and derivatives, while Niger and Mali excel in 
live animal exports and Senegal accounts for 90% of the trade bloc’s exports of fish and fish products. 
The Côte d'Ivoire accounts for almost all of the ECOWAS exports of coffee and tea. 
 
The key point here is that it appears that ECOWAS countries specialize in their respective areas of 
comparative advantage, which is linked to their geographical location. This tends to indicate potential 
for efficient trade among ECOWAS countries. While intra-ECOWAS trade is insignificant for most 
commodities, there are exceptions, including exports of live animals by Niger and Mali, and of fish by 
Senegal. 
 
5.2. Variables  
 
The dependent variable in most of our gravity equation regressions is the log of agricultural exports 
from country i to country j measured in 2006 US dollars. In line with standard gravity models, we use 
regressors that include GDP, population, and bilateral distances. Distance is measured as a population-
weighted average of the distances between the main cities in pairs of countries.
9   
 
Most of the remaining variables are binary, and include the following: 
−  a contiguity variable, set to 1 if the exporter and destination countries share the same border; 
−  a language variable, set to 1 if the trading partners share the same official language; 
−  a colonial link variable, set to 1 if the two countries had any colonial link; 
−  a colonial heritage variable, set to 1 if the two countries share a common colonial heritage; 
−  a dummy variable that equal one if the country is a member of any regional trade agreement; 
−  fourteen intra- and extra-RTA variables, for ASEAN, CEMAC, COMESA, ECOWAS, EU, 
MERCOSUR and NAFTA. This allows us to determine whether the net effect of RTAs differs 
across geographical regions or by the classification of partners involved, as discussed above; 
−  a currency union variable, set to 1 if the trading partners are members of the same currency 
union. 
 
Two other useful variables are included in most of the regressions. The first measures the average 
tariff rate on agricultural imports into country i from country j; the numbers come from the World 
Bank’s  Distortions to Agricultural Incentive project (Anderson et al., 2008b). The second is the 
logistics potential index (LPI), also developed at the behest of the World Bank; it measures the quality 
of the logistics infrastructure in a country, and has been used in the context of gravity models of trade 




8 The database lists 150 countries with populations of a million or more (including Puerto Rico), but trade data 
were only available for 135 of these countries, and in some cases only for one of the three years. 
9 The information on distance is available via http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm . 
10 The data may be found at http://go.worldbank.org/88X6PU5GV0 . Non-Tariff Barriers in ECOWAS    Page 12 of 28 
A full list of variables, with their definitions, sources of data, and basic descriptive statistics, is 
provided in Tables A2 and A3.  
 
6.  Empirical Results 
 
In this section we present and discuss the estimates from a number of different model specifications. 
These are all worldwide models, in the sense that they use data from the largest possible sample of 
countries. 
 
We begin with the results of a flexible model (see equation 1) that includes a substantial number of 
control variables. The details are set out in Table 3, with separate columns for the results of each year 
(2000, 2003, and 2006). The dependent variable is the natural log of the US dollar value of bilateral 
exports; where exports are zero, we used ln(0.1), rather than dropping these observations (as done by, 
for instance, Baier and Bergstrand 2005). There are more than 15,000 observations for each year, and 
the fit is respectable in each case, with values of R
2 of 0.42 (for 2006) or higher. Unless otherwise 
noted, all the standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent (“robust”), based on White’s method 
(Greene 2003). 
 
The coefficients are quite consistent from one year to the next.  As expected, agricultural trade is 
strongly associated with larger GDP, with elasticities of about 2.
11 These are relatively high, but are 
consistent with the observed increase over time in the share of world trade relative to GDP. 
 
Almost all the other variables have the expected sign and, given the large size of the data set, are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Agricultural trade falls as distance rises, and it is lower if a 
country is landlocked, but higher if countries share a common border, or a common language. Higher 
import tariffs are strongly associated with less trade, as predicted by theory. 
 
Our main interest is in the effect of free-trade areas, especially ECOWAS, on trade. Other things being 
equal, if two countries are members of ECOWAS (i.e. intra_ECOWAS = 1), agricultural trade 
between them is higher than one might have expected; this effect holds even after controlling for the 
zero tariffs on agricultural trade within ECOWAS. This higher level of trade does not appear to come 
at the expense of trade with other countries – the coefficient on extra_ECOWAS is not negative (see 
Table 2 for the relevant taxonomy). In short, these results do not suggest that non-tariff barriers on 
agricultural trade are particularly high within ECOWAS, at least relative to the rest of the world. 
 
Table 3.  Estimates of Flexible Gravity Model for Agricultural Exports 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 



















11 Note that the elasticity of agricultural exports with respect to GDP is given by the sum of the coefficients on 














































  (0.261)  (0.253)  (0.273)  (0.314) 
colony  0.711
*  0.393  0.288  0.434 




















































  (0.186)  (0.182)  (0.202)  (0.216) 
extra_ecowas  0.301  0.276  1.562
***  1.113
*** 












  (0.227)  (0.228)  (0.263)  (0.276) 
extra_nafta  0.112 ‐ 0.326 ‐ 2.464
*** ‐ 2.434
*** 












N  15472  16277  15336  13448 
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The evidence for COMESA and SADC also suggests that agricultural NTBs are not particularly strong 
within those groupings, but the results are less pronounced than for ECOWAS. The negative 
coefficient on the INTRA_EU variable – suggesting that agricultural trade with in the EU is lower than 
one might expect – seems surprising at first sight, but it should be noted that the model estimated here 
refers specifically to agricultural trade, which is distorted within the EU due to the Common 
Agricultural Policy. The inclusion of logistics performance makes little difference to the results, as 
shown by the final column of Table 3. 
 
The results shown in column (1) of Table 4 are based on pooling the data for the three years, after 
adjusting to real dollars in 2000 prices,
12 and confirm the findings of the year-by-year estimates in 
Table 3. The middle column of Table 4 is also based on the pooled data, but it includes dummy 
variables for all exporters, and for all importers.  This improves the fit of the equation, but removes the 
effect of the ECOWAS variable (which did not change during the three years covered here), and 
changes the sign of the ln_GDPdestination variable to an implausible -3.1.
13 The results in the final 
column of Table 4 are also based on pooling the data, but in this case all observations with zero 
exports are omitted.  Since country dummies are not included here, the results may be compared with 
those in column (1). Although it is not appropriate to ignore the zero-export cases, they are often 
omitted (e.g. by Baier and Bergstrand 2005); the result is to bias the coefficients in an OLS model 
toward zero (Greene 2003).  In our pooled sample, 45% of cases show zero exports, which implies that 
the coefficient estimates in column (3) will be biased downward by almost a half.
14 
 
How robust are these results? We address this question by estimating a number of other specifications 
of the gravity model; if these point to the same essential conclusions, then we can have greater 
confidence in those findings. 
 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating a stripped-down version of the flexible gravity model for 
agriculture for 2000. The model reported in column (1) is a subset off the more elaborate equation 
whose results are shown in column (1) of Table 3. The fit here is still good, and the traditional 
variables – GDPs, distance, contiguity, common language, and membership of a regional trade 
association – are highly significant and have the expected signs and magnitudes. The results of 
estimating a similar, but theoretically-motivated model – where the dependent variable is 
ln{agricultural exports/(GDPexporter×GDPpartner)} – are given in column (2). The fit is poorer, but the 
remaining variables have coefficients that are very similar to those in the flexible model. The third 
column adds a variable for the agricultural tariff rate to the theoretically-motivated model; higher 
tariffs are associated with less trade, and the presence of a regional trade agreement further boosts 
                                                            
12 GDP figures are deflated to 2000 prices using the US GDP deflator; export figures are deflated to 2000 prices 
using the US export price deflator. 
13 We also estimated a specification that included dummy variables for every pair of countries, but given our 
relatively short time series – just three points in time – these dummy variables picked up most of the effects that 
earlier had been attributable to policy-relevant variables (such as whether the country was a member of an FTA, 
or of ECOWAS, etc.). The resulting model had just four statistically significant variables (apart from the country 
dummies), some of which had implausible signs. 
14 Greene (2003, p.766) notes that the OLS coefficients are approximately equal to the Tobit coefficients 
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  (0.140)  (0.418)  (0.062) 








  (0.113)  (0.264)  (0.067) 
N  47085  47085  26648 
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  (0.204)  (0.216)  (0.215)  (0.201)  (0.197)  (0.103) 
prefrate     ‐ 1.613
***      
     (0.388)      
N  16688  16688  15977  16688  16688  7,302 
r2  0.502  0.114  0.116  0.518  0.100  0.39 
F  4795.455  716.267  585.355  3542.068  690.508  
pvalue  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  







The last three columns report the results of a gravity model applied to all exports, not just agricultural 
exports. The results look similar to those found for agricultural trade alone, which provides a 
pragmatic justification for our estimates that focus only on agricultural trade. Here too, the 
theoretically-motivated version of the model fits less well, but the coefficients remain plausible. The 
final column shows, for comparative purposes, the estimation results for all trade in 2000 reported by 
Baier & Bergstrand. Their coefficients are smaller, as is to be expected, since they exclude zero-export 
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  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 







  (0.087)  (0.085)  (0.105)  (0.054)  (0.062) 
prefrate ‐ 0.200  0.016  1.642
**  0.203 ‐ 1.003
*** 


























































  (0.628)  (0.585)  (0.645)  (0.362)  (1.016) 
ecowas ‐ 1.410
* ‐ 0.546  1.435 ‐ 0.109  
































































  (0.242)  (0.234)  (0.345)  (0.163)  (0.703) 
extra_sadc  0.059 ‐ 0.079 ‐ 0.739
*** ‐ 0.210 ‐ 1.322
*** 
  (0.197)  (0.196)  (0.210)  (0.117)  (0.249) 
N  15977  16519  15450  47946  47946 
r2  0.241  0.220  0.154  0.192  0.446 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The estimates reported in Table 6 are for an extended version of the theoretically-motivated model, 
which here includes dummy variables for a variety of free trade areas. The dependent variable here is 
ln{agricultural exports/(GDPexporter*GDPpartner)}, but in all other respects the models are the same as 
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those in Tables 3 and 4.  Columns (1)-(3) in Table 6 present the results for each year, column (4) pools 
the data for the three years, and column (5) shows the results when exporter and partner dummies are 
included. The results are not fully compelling: the fit is poor; and the tariff rate does not generally have 
a statistically significant effect on trade, which is surprising.  In this case, the intra_ECOWAS variable 
is not significant (except in 2000, when it is negative, and significant at the 5% level), which we 
interpret as implying that NTBs in agriculture in ECOWAS are not worse than elsewhere. In the model 
with exporter and partner dummies, most of the effects of interest to policy makers drop out, or are 
identified on the basis of very few, and potentially atypical, observations. 
 
Table 7 and 8 explore the implications of dealing squarely with the problem of the numerous zero 
values for agricultural exports.  We return first to the flexible model of Table 4, using pooled data for 
all three years, where the dependent variable is ln(agricultural exports).  The estimates in Table 7 are 
based on a Tobit model, with lower bound censoring at zero; in practice the results in our model are 
not very sensitive to the choice of lower bound; Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) took a similar approach. 
 
The most usual presentation of the Tobit model supposes that there is a latent variable y*– we could 
think of this as “potential exports” perhaps – that depends on a set of X covariates and an error term, 
so: 
* . ii y i β ε =+ X  












⎧ ≤ ⎪ = ⎨
> ⎪ ⎩
 
If the data are simply truncated at zero, this is similar to leaving out the zero observations (as done by 
Baier and Bergstrand 2005), and one gets the marginal effects shown in column (4) of Table 7.   
However, if the data are more properly thought of as censored – we would like to export, but fixed 
costs related to trading make it impractical, for small quantities at least – then we get the marginal 
effects shown in column (5); these are close to the OLS estimates in Table 4. 
 
Another way to deal with the problem of zero-export observations is by using a two-step procedure. In 
step 1, a probit equation is used to determine whether agricultural exports are greater than zero, and in 
step 2 we estimate the effect of variables on agricultural trade, conditional on the trade being non-zero. 
The results of estimating such a Heckman two-step procedure – sometimes referred to as a type-2 
Tobit model – are displayed in Table 8. The log likelihood is higher than for the Tobit model, which is 
a point in favor of the two-step approach. A likelihood ratio test shows that the two equations are not 
independent – we have χ
2(1) = 23.7, with a p-value of 0.00 – which implies that this selection model 
makes sense. For our purposes, the most important point may be that here (and in the Tobit model), the 
coefficient on the intra-ECOWAS term is positive and statistically significant. This is at least 








effect of y*  SE  p‐value  Truncated  Censored 
ln_GDPexp  2.990  0.032  0.00  1.527  2.159 
ln_GDPdestn  2.150  0.030  0.00  1.098  1.553 
ln_GDPcapexp ‐ 0.422  0.053  0.00 ‐ 0.215 ‐ 0.304 
ln_GDPcapd~n  0.422  0.051  0.00  0.216  0.305 
log_Dist ‐ 3.043  0.064  0.00 ‐ 1.554 ‐ 2.197 
prefrate ‐ 4.318  0.361  0.00 ‐ 2.205 ‐ 3.118 
border  1.221  0.284  0.00  0.648  0.911 
rta_dummy  0.712  0.188  0.00  0.371  0.523 
com_lang  4.207  0.159  0.00  2.411  3.312 
cu_2cfa  0.299  0.322  0.35  0.154  0.218 
comcol  2.223  0.176  0.00  1.210  1.689 
colony ‐ 0.158  0.328  0.63 ‐ 0.080 ‐ 0.114 
landlocked ‐ 1.235  0.116  0.00 ‐ 0.615 ‐ 0.872 
asean  2.560  0.699  0.00  1.423  1.975 
comesa  3.037  0.451  0.00  1.710  2.364 
ecowas  6.732  0.494  0.00  4.236  5.615 
eu ‐ 1.770  0.412  0.00 ‐ 0.853 ‐ 1.212 
mercosur  4.089  1.375  0.00  2.386  3.261 
nafta ‐ 7.587  1.931  0.00 ‐ 2.992 ‐ 4.142 
sadc  3.965  0.562  0.00  2.301  3.151 
extra_asean  2.703  0.134  0.00  1.481  2.062 
extra_comesa  0.106  0.148  0.47  0.054  0.077 
extra_ecowas  0.805  0.134  0.00  0.418  0.590 
extra_eu  1.649  0.116  0.00  0.870  1.223 
extra_merc~r  1.084  0.173  0.00  0.571  0.803 
extra_nafta ‐ 1.727  0.201  0.00 ‐ 0.837 ‐ 1.189 
extra_sadc ‐ 0.186  0.154  0.23 ‐ 0.094 ‐ 0.133 
_cons ‐ 92.814  1.105  0.00    
N  47,085     Censored  20,442 
Pseudo R
2  0.12     Uncensored  26,643 
Chi2 (27)  28,554        
p‐value  0        
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  Second‐stage equation  First‐stage (probit) equation 
  Coeff  SE  p‐value  Coeff  SE  p‐value 
ln_GDPexp  0.916  0.014  0.00  0.420  0.006  0.00 
ln_GDPdestn  0.740  0.012  0.00  0.288  0.005  0.00 
ln_GDPcapexp ‐ 0.299  0.019  0.00 ‐ 0.060  0.009  0.00 
ln_GDPcapd~n  0.060  0.018  0.00  0.054  0.008  0.00 
log_Dist ‐ 0.957  0.023  0.00 ‐ 0.419  0.012  0.00 
prefrate ‐ 1.535  0.131  0.00 ‐ 0.658  0.060  0.00 
border  1.210  0.090  0.00  0.136  0.065  0.04 
rta_dummy  0.533  0.059  0.00  0.236  0.044  0.00 
com_lang  1.008  0.055  0.00  0.588  0.030  0.00 
cu_2cfa  0.598  0.100  0.00  0.172  0.082  0.04 
comcol  0.540  0.065  0.00  0.260  0.028  0.00 
colony  1.084  0.101  0.00  0.047  0.090  0.61 
landlocked ‐ 0.390  0.045  0.00 ‐ 0.126  0.018  0.00 
asean  1.773  0.220  0.00 ‐ 0.047  0.149  0.75 
comesa ‐ 0.089  0.169  0.60  0.310  0.075  0.00 
ecowas  0.806  0.170  0.00  0.752  0.090  0.00 
eu  0.538  0.128  0.00 ‐ 0.097  0.123  0.43 
mercosur  2.214  0.412  0.00  7.910  8141949  1.00 
nafta  1.423  0.594  0.02 ‐ 1.819  0.498  0.00 
sadc  1.037  0.199  0.00  0.348  0.093  0.00 
extra_asean  0.829  0.048  0.00  0.338  0.023  0.00 
extra_comesa ‐ 0.173  0.058  0.00  0.046  0.023  0.05 
extra_ecowas  0.541  0.053  0.00  0.123  0.021  0.00 
extra_eu  0.213  0.040  0.00  0.293  0.021  0.00 
extra_merc~r  0.440  0.061  0.00  0.135  0.030  0.00 
extra_nafta  0.181  0.066  0.01 ‐ 0.271  0.039  0.00 
extra_sadc  0.150  0.060  0.01 ‐ 0.011  0.024  0.64 
_cons ‐ 17.045  0.495  0.00 ‐ 13.156  0.197  0.00 
N  47,085   Censored  20,437   
Pseudo R
2     Uncensored  26,648   
Chi2 (27)  10,442          
p‐value  0.00          
Log likelihood ‐ 87,772          
 
 
7. Agricultural Protection 
 
When governments wish to favor their domestic agriculture, there are a number of policy instruments 
that they may use, including tariffs on imports, NTBs, and subsidies.  Recently, Anderson et al. 
(2008a), with World Bank support, have developed a methodology for measuring distortion to 
agricultural incentives, and have generated estimates for a large number of countries, including non-
tariff barriers in cases where data were available.  The information is summarized in the form of the 
nominal rate of assistance (nra); import tariffs or subsidies, on agricultural goods raise the nra above 
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zero. 
 
Worldwide, the nra was 0.217 (see Table 9), averaged over 2000, 2003, and 2006, which indicates 
relatively high levels of protection to agriculture. But the nra for the ECOWAS countries was -0.078, 
showing that agriculture there was, on balance, disfavored. Table 9 shows this to be true in each of the 
ECOWAS countries for which data are available.   
 
In short, ECOWAS countries do not assist agriculture; indeed, they do just the opposite. So we should 
not be surprised that evidence of NTBs in agriculture in these countries is weak. 
 
Table 9.  Nominal Rates of Assistance to Agriculture 
  nra_covt  nra_tott  rra  tbi  N / N(rra) 
All years:       
All countries  0.217  0.219  0.177 ‐ 0.179  26,522 / 24,734 
ECOWAS ‐ 0.078 ‐ 0.019 ‐ 0.204 ‐ 0.136  240 / 140 
2000        
All countries  0.198  0.197  0.153 ‐ 0.157  10,877 /  9,834 
ECOWAS ‐ 0.085 ‐ 0.062 ‐ 0.210 ‐ 0.079  120 / 60 
2003        
All countries  0.203  0.207  0.160 ‐ 0.224  10,877 / 10,132 
ECOWAS ‐ 0.072 ‐ 0.056 ‐ 0.198 ‐ 0.193  120 / 60 
2006        
All countries  0.290  0.300  0.265 ‐ 0.125  4,768 / 4,768 
ECOWAS  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  
Benin ‐ 0.020 ‐ 0.012   ‐ 0.032  
Burkina Faso ‐ 0.040 ‐ 0.014   ‐ 0.050  
Côte d’Ivoire ‐ 0.258 ‐ 0.232 ‐ 0.346 ‐ 0.539  
Ghana ‐ 0.062 ‐ 0.043 ‐ 0.163 ‐ 0.424  
Mali ‐ 0.035 ‐ 0.007   ‐ 0.025  
Nigeria ‐ 0.057 ‐ 0.070 ‐ 0.107  0.388  
Senegal ‐ 0.124 ‐ 0.078 ‐ 0.200 ‐ 0.307  











It is widely believed that barriers to trade in Africa are serious. We examine this proposition in the 
context of agricultural trade within ECOWAS. The fifteen countries of the group are important 
agricultural producers, although their cash crops vary widely.  There is agricultural trade among the 
ECOWAS countries, but we have found anecdotal evidence of impediments to truck-based trade, in 
the form of bribes demanded routinely at police checkpoints. 
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provide assistance, overall, to the agricultural sector. Might there nonetheless be NTBs that, essentially 
unobserved or unquantified, restrict agricultural trade within the group? To test this, we have estimated 
a gravity model for agricultural trade, using worldwide data for 2000, 2003, and 2006, and using a 
variety of econometric specifications. 
 
The message that emerges is clear. Agricultural trade within ECOWAS is, if anything, greater than one 
would expect, even after controlling for tariffs and many other relevant variables. A plausible 
interpretation is that NTBs on agricultural within ECOWAS are not particularly important. 
 
This does not mean that there are no barriers at all to agricultural trade – we have found tangible 
evidence of some trade barriers – but these barriers appear to be no higher, and are likely lower, than 
in the rest of the world. 
 
It is also possible that our model, or the estimates, are flawed. And the theoretical case for confining 
the gravity model to agricultural goods only is not as strong as the case for using total trade. On the 
other hand, our conclusions are robust to a variety of alternative specifications; and where comparisons 
are possible, our results look plausible. 
 
For policy makers in ECOWAS, our results have some useful implications. First, since NTBs in 
agriculture do not appear to be unduly onerous, efforts to foster trade are free to focus elsewhere. 
Second, there is always scope for reducing the costs of trading, through investments in better roads, 
faster customs clearance, and fewer policy payoffs, although as usually, a careful weighing of the costs 
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d'Ivoire Gambia Ghana Guinea Mali  Niger  Nigeria  Senegal Togo  Total   
Cocoa and cocoa preparations   0.0  57.2  0.0  42.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.1  0.2  100 
Edible fruit, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons   4.3  61.2  0.2  30.1  0.0  0.8  0.1  2.0  1.3  0.0  100 
Fish, crustaceans, mollusks, aquatic invertebrates nes   0.5  1.7  0.1  5.9  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.0  90.8  0.1  100 
Lac, gums, resins, vegetable saps and extracts nes    0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  97.8 2.1 0.0  100 
Meat, fish and seafood food preparations nes  0.2  70.8  0.0  20.6  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 8.5 0.0  100 
Animal, vegetable fats and oils, cleavage products, etc. 6.1  48.5  0.0  1.0 0.0 1.8 1.6 0.0  36.2 4.9  100 
Miscellaneous edible preparations   0.0  74.7 0.0  0.6  0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0  23.4 0.6  100 
Coffee, tea, mate and spices   0.0  93.3 0.0  0.8  1.7 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.1 3.0  100 
Live  animals  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.8  0.0  56.7  42.3 0.0 0.1 0.0  100 
Raw hides and skins (other than fur skins) and leather   0.0 2.4 0.0  0.3  0.0  2.4  1.0 83.7 10.3  0.0 100 
 




d'Ivoire Gambia Ghana Guinea Mali  Niger  Nigeria  Senegal Togo  Total   
Cocoa and cocoa preparations   0.0  73.7 0.0  26.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3  100 
Edible fruit, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons   5.7  60.0  0.0  14.3  19.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.2  100 
Fish, crustaceans, mollusks, aquatic invertebrates ne   0.7  1.6  0.2  6.6  0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0  87.6 1.7  100 
Meat, fish and seafood food preparations nes  0.0  51.9  0.0  38.4  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 9.5 0.2  100 
Animal, vegetable fats and oils, cleavage products, etc. 4.1  48.9 0.8  5.8 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.2  28.9 9.0  100 
Miscellaneous edible preparations   0.1  85.7 0.0  0.9  0.0 0.5 0.2 0.0  12.0 0.6  100 
Coffee, tea, mate and spices   0.1  89.1 0.0  7.7  0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.3  100 
Live  animals  0.0 0.1 0.0  5.9  0.0  45.3  48.6 0.0 0.1 0.0  100 
Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes  16.0 8  0.9  2.7  0.0 1.2 7.9 0.0  59.3 7.4  100 
Oil seed, oleagic fruits, grain, seed, fruit, etc, nes  18.7  21.8  0.8  36.1  0.0 0.83  5.8 1.0 4.1  10.9  100 
 






d'Ivoire Gambia Ghana Guinea Mali  Niger  Nigeria  Senegal Togo  Total   
Cocoa and cocoa preparations   0.0  0.0  77.0 0.0  22.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3  100 
Edible fruit, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons    7.6 0.8  74.0 0.2  14.0 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 1.8 0.2  100 
Fish, crustaceans, mollusks, aquatic invertebrates ne    0.5 0.0 3.0 1.2 6.4 0.8 0.0 0.7 0.7  85.7 1.1  100 
Meat, fish and seafood food preparations nes   0.0 0.0  61.4 0.1  28.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.8 0.1  100 
Animal, vegetable fats and oils, cleavage products, etc. 0.7 2.3  39.1 0.1 4.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 1.7  50.6 1.0  100 
Miscellaneous edible preparations   0.0  0.5  93.0 0.0 1.6 0.5 0.0 0.8 0.0 3.2 0.4  100 
Coffee, tea, mate and spices   0.0  0.0  90.3 0.0 2.4 2.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 4.2  100 
Live animals  0.0  22.9  0.3  0.0  0.4 0.1 0.2  76.1 0.0 0.0 0.0  100 
Oil seed, oleagic fruits, grain, seed, fruit, etc, nes  14.4 5.4 5.7 9.3  12.2 1.0 1.1 7.2  35.0 3.8 4.9  100 
Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes  4.8 3.1  12.5 0.0  20.4 0.1 0.0  53.8 0.0 2.8 2.4  100 
  
Table A2: Variable Definitions and Sources  
Variable Variable  Definition  Nature  Source 
colony Indicates  colonial  ties  Binary  CEPII 
comcol Indicates  common  colonizer  Binary  CEPII 
comlang_off Indicates  common  colonizer  Binary  CEPII 
contig Indicates  contiguity Binary  CEPII 
cu_2cfa Indicates  currency  union  Binary  Rose and Engel, 2001; European Union, IMF 
dist Distance  Binary  CEPII 
distw Weighted  distance  Binary  CEPII 
exp_agric  Total agricultural exports  Continous  COMTRADE 
extra_africa  1 if trade outside Africa  Binary   
extra_asean  1 if trade outside Asean  Binary   
extra_cemac  1 if trade outside Cemac  Binary   
extra_comesa  1 if trade outside Comesa  Binary   
extra_ECOWAS  1 if trade outside ECOWAS  Binary   
extra_eu  1 if trade outside Eu  Binary   
extra_merc~r  1 if trade outside Mercusor  Binary   
extra_nafta  1 if trade outside Nafta  Binary   
extra_sadc  1 if trade outside Sadc  Binary   
extra_waemu  1 if trade outside Weamu  Binary   
gdp2005ppp  GDP PPP in 2005 USD  Continous  WDI 
gdpcap2005~p  GDP constant 2000 USD  Continous  WDI 
intra_africa  1 if both partners Africa  Binary   
intra_extr~a  1 if at least one Africa  Binary   
pop_total Total  population  Binary  CEPII 
rta_dummy  1 if regional trade agreement  Binary  Various sources 
Prefrate Tariff  on  agricultural inputs  Continuous  World Bank 
Lpi  Logistics Performance Index  Continuous  World Bank 




Table A3: Selected Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Variable  Definition Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
colony Indicates  colonial  ties 64,824  0.013 0.115 0 1 
comcol Indicates  common  colonizer  64,824  0.073 0.260  0  1 
comlang_off Indicates  common  colonizer  64,824  0.126  0.332  0  1 
contig Indicates  contiguity  64,824  0.024  0.153  0 1 
cu_2cfa Indicates  currency union  66,603  0.019  0.136  0  1 
dist Distance,  km  64,824 7,175  4,198  9.6  19,812 
distw weighted  distance,  km 64,824  7,167 4,193 8.9  19,650 
exp_agric  Total agricultural exports 66,603  2.72E+07  2.86E+08 0  1.83E+10 
extra_africa  1 if trade outside Africa  66,603  0.432  0.495  0  1 
extra_asean  1 if trade outside Asean  66,603  0.114  0.317  0  1 
extra_cemac  1 if trade outside Cemac  66,603  0.065  0.246  0  1 
extra_comesa  1 if trade outside Comesa  66,603  0.232  0.422  0  1 
extra_ECOWAS  1 if trade outside ECOWAS  66,603  0.181  0.385  0  1 
extra_eu  1 if trade outside Eu  66,603  0.197  0.398  0  1 
extra_merc~r  1 if trade outside Mercusor  66,603  0.052  0.223  0  1 
extra_nafta  1 if trade outside Nafta  66,603  0.039  0.195  0  1 
extra_sadc  1 if trade outside Sadc  66,603  0.159  0.366  0  1 
extra_waemu  1 if trade outside Weamu  66,603  0.102  0.302  0  1 
gdp2005ppp  GDP PPP in 2005 USD  64,219  3.61E+11 1.15E+12  6.39E+08  1.27E+13 
gdpcap2005~p  GDP constant 2000 USD  64,219  10,286  11,718  251  51,586 
intra_africa  1 if both partners Africa  66,603  0.100  0.299  0  1 
intra_extr~a  1 if at least one Africa  66,603  0.531  0.500  0  1 
pop_total Total  population  19,966  7.92E+07 2.00E+08  1323000  1.31E+09 
rta_dummy  1 if regional trade agreement  66,603  0.091  0.287  0  1 
trade Total  exports  66,603  2.92E+08 3.13E+09  0.01  2.42E+11 
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Table A4: List of Countries 
Albania  Croatia   Ireland  Nepal  South Africa 
Algeria Cuba  Israel  Netherlands  Spain 
Angola  Czech Republic  Italy  New Zealand  Sri Lanka 
Argentina Côte  d'Ivoire  Jamaica  Nicaragua  Sudan 
Armenia Denmark  Japan Niger  Swaziland 
Australia  Dominican Republic Jordan  Nigeria  Sweden 
Austria Ecuador  Kazakhstan  Norway  Switzerland 
Azerbaijan Egypt Kenya  Oman  Syria 
Bangladesh El  Salvador  Kuwait  Pakistan Tajikistan 
Belarus Eritrea  Kyrgyzstan  Panama  Tanzania 
Belgium Estonia  Laos  Papua New Guinea  Thailand 
Benin Ethiopia  Latvia  Paraguay  Timor-Leste 
Bolivia Finland  Lebanon  Peru Togo 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  France  Lesotho  Philippines  Trinidad and Tobago 
Botswana Gabon  Liberia Poland  Tunisia 
Brazil Gambia  Libya Portugal  Turkey 
Bulgaria  Georgia  Lithuania  Korea, Dem. People’s R.  Turkmenistan 
Burkina Faso  Germany  Macedonia Korea,  Rep.  USA 
Burundi Ghana  Madagascar  Moldova  Uganda 
Cambodia Greece  Malawi  Romania  Ukraine 
Cameroon  Guatemala  Malaysia  Russia  United Arab Emirates 
Canada Guinea  Mali  Rwanda  United  Kingdom 
Central African Republic  Guinea-Bissau  Mauritania Saudi  Arabia  Uruguay 
Chad Haiti Mauritius  Senegal Uzbekistan 
Chile Honduras  Mexico  Serbia  &  Montenegro  Venezuela 
China Hong  Kong  Mongolia  Sierra Leone Vietnam 
Colombia Hungary  Morocco  Singapore Yemen 
Congo, Dem.Rep.  India Mozambique  Slovakia  Zambia 
Congo, Rep.  Indonesia  Myanmar Slovenia  Zimbabwe 
Costa Rica  Iran  Namibia  Somalia  
Note:  Data were not available for countries shown here in italics. 
 